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Título: Estabilidad de medida en la Alta capacidad intelectual: resultados 
preliminares. 
Resumen: A pesar de que ha habido mejoras en la eficiencia y facilidad en 
las puntuaciones de los tests para medir a alumnos de alta capacidad inte-
lectual (ACI), no obstante la estabilidad de las puntuaciones no está asegu-
rada. El objetivo principal de esta investigación es la detección de las varia-
ciones en la medida de un grupo de adolescentes de ACI, mediante una 
evaluación única, y que actualmente están siguiendo un programa de enri-
quecimiento. Un total de n = 26 estudiantes participaron (19 hombres y 7 
mujeres) en el estudio. El rango de edad osciló entre los 12 y los 17 años, 
siendo la edad promedio de 13.89 años (DT = 1.09 años). El Test de Apti-
tud Diferencial-5 (DAT-5) y el Test de Torrance de Pensamiento Creativo 
(TTCT) se usaron para evaluar las habilidades intelectuales lógico-
deductivas y el pensamiento creativo. Los resultados muestran que las pun-
tuaciones pueden cambiar en una cantidad considerable en muchas perso-
nas supuestamente de ACI. Más del 30% de la varianza no puede atribuirse 
a componentes comunes de medición entre los dos momentos temporales. 
Las puntuaciones en creatividad fueron los más fluctuantes, algo que podría 
esperarse debido a los bajos niveles de fiabilidad. Solo ocho participantes 
permanecen constantes, de acuerdo con el criterio de la desviación están-
dar. Es bastante notorio que dos participantes muestran una disminución 
en tres subescalas de cada cinco medidas. Por otro lado, otros dos partici-
pantes han mostrado un aumento en una subescala y una disminución en 
otra. Con el fin de fomentar las personas con ACI y su bienestar, es esencial 
tener cuidado con los diagnósticos erróneos (falsos negativos y falsos posi-
tivos), ya que van a producir consecuencias de desarrollo. 
Palabras clave: medición; alta capacidad intelectual; evaluación; estabili-
dad. 
  Abstract: Despite there having been improvements in efficiency and ease 
on test scoring for individuals with high intellectual ability, the stability of 
these scores is not assured. The main objective of our research is a prelimi-
nary detection of variations in test scores from a group of children that 
were identified as having HIA. This was done by means of a single-time as-
sessment of children currently following an enrichment program. A total of 
n=26 students participated (19 male and 7 female) in the study. The age 
range was between 12 and 17 years, being the average age 13.89 years (SD 
= 1.09 years). Differential Aptitude Test (DAT-5) and Torrance Test of 
Creative Thinking (TTCT) were used to assess the logical-deductive intel-
lectual skills and creative thinking. The results show that test scores may 
change in a considerable amount in many supposedly HIA individuals. 
More than 30% of the variance cannot be attributed to common compo-
nents in the two measurements points. The scores in creativity were the 
most fluctuating, something that could be expected of these scales having 
the lowest reliability indexes. Only eight participants remain steady, accord-
ing to the one standard deviation criterion, and it is quite notorious that 
two participants show a decrease in three subscales out of five. On the 
other hand, two other participants have shown an increase in one subscale 
as well as a decrease in another. In order to foster HIA individuals and 
their wellbeing, it is essential to be careful with mistaken diagnoses (false-
negatives and false-positives), given the fact that they will lead to develop-
mental consequences. 
Keywords: Measurement; High intellectual ability; Assessment; Stability. 
 
Introduction 
 
The identification procedures of high intellectual abilities 
(HIA) have evolved from traditional approaches which fol-
lowed the influential Terman’s (Terman, 1926) idea that 
HIA was unidimensional and directly related to scoring high 
on intelligence tests; to contemporary approaches, which in-
volve a multidimensional conceptualisation as well as multi-
ple sources of data obtained through a variety of instru-
ments and strategies based both on performance and non-
performance methods (Acar et al., 2016; Pfeiffer, 2008). The 
issue had an important shift at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, when the concept of HIA was equally associated with 
high abilities and exceptional performance (Robinson and 
Clinkenbeard, 2008) due to the increasing interest of experts 
on creativity and its products (Warne, 2016). 
Nowadays, few experts in the gifted field embrace the classic 
view of giftedness as a mere high IQ (Sternberg et al., 2011). 
However, the lay public, the administration and many pro-
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fessionals still hold the belief that high IQ is the same as 
HIA, (Silverman, 2009; Worrell, 2009) considering it to be 
an essential, static trait which is permanent all lifelong. Con-
sequently, students identified with a high IQ score and clas-
sified as gifted or talented in the early grades (as early as pre-
school or kindergarten) are not required to demonstrate sub-
sequent evidence in the later grades that they represent a 
case of HIA. If no exceptional performance is achieved at 
youth or adulthood, they are frequently considered as ―lost‖ 
cases of HIA. 
The contributions of the late 20th century and the first 
decades of the 21st century, have fostered a significant 
change in how HIA is defined and conceptualized 
(Horowitz et al., 2009) in the so called ―New Paradigm‖ 
(Dai, 2005; Dai and Chen, 2014). According to the New 
Paradigm, experts have advocated for a more comprehen-
sive, conceptually sophisticated, and diagnostically defensible 
approach to identify gifted students (Heller and Perleth, 
2008; Pfeiffer, 2011; VanTassel-Baska et al., 2007). Central 
questions associated with this modern approach focus on 
the true definition of HIA, contemplating what it actually 
means to be ―gifted‖ or ―talented‖. More specifically, is gift-
edness an immutable attribute of an individual? Can a young 
child be identified as gifted in kindergarten but not gifted in 
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later years? Is it possible to have a stable psychometric ap-
proximation to intellectual abilities? Such questions are 
grounded in the empirical experience that demonstrate that 
IQ scores can change, and sometimes dramatically (Nisbett, 
2009). Moreover, there are considerable evidences that high 
IQ is only one of the predictors of academic success, though 
it is not a good predictor of success in life (Sternberg, 2004), 
especially when IQ scores have been obtained in the early 
years. And there exist other reliable predictors of the expres-
sion of HIA in eminent adulthood products (Subotnik et al., 
2011; Tomlinson, 2009). 
In order to explain these points, the New Paradigm in-
troduces some relevant explanations, such as: 
a) HIA is not a fixed trait but a developmental one 
(Subotnik et al., 2011). Although there is some evidence 
for a genetic influence in the expression of giftedness 
(Plomin and Spinath, 2004) it requires a nurturing and 
supportive environment. Consequently, experts advocate 
for a developmental model that views giftedness as a 
transforming high intellectual ability and potential talent 
in specific, culturally-valued domains, into outstanding 
performance and innovation in adulthood (Feldhusen, 
2005; Pfeiffer, 2011). This view is consistent with recent 
claims to re-conceptualize giftedness and gifted educa-
tion within a talent development model (Horowitz et al., 
2009; Subotnik, 2009) of eminence (Subotnik, 2003), or a 
tripartite model which considers three alternative ways to 
view giftedness: high intelligence, outstanding academic 
accomplishments, and/or potential to excellence 
(Pfeiffer, 2011). 
b) HIA is not unidimensional but multidimensional includ-
ing creativity and motivational trends. IQ may account 
for a substantial part of the variance, though not the 
larger part, in predicting a student’s academic perfor-
mance. The predicted variance becomes rather small 
when predictions are made for real-world success 
(Nisbett, 2009; Worrell, 2009). IQ should only be con-
sidered as one of the indicators of a convergent excep-
tional ability or an uncommon promise in the classroom 
at a given point in time (Keating, 2009). Furthermore, 
there exist a number of cautionary notes and cogent rec-
ommendations about the appropriate use of brief intelli-
gence tests (Pierson et al., 2012) highlighting the im-
portance of changing measuring practices. 
 
The central concern consists of the necessity to capture a 
construct in development (Subotnik et al., 2011) which an-
swer many questions regarding its nature (multidimensionali-
ty, developmental manifestation, etc.) which go beyond the 
IQ domain (Warne, 2016). The assessment of high abilities 
by means of test scores in children is a measurement situa-
tion where many underlying factors come together. On the 
one hand, brain’s maturation gives rise to complex structural 
changes (Geake, 2009), during the first twelve to sixteen 
years of life, which determine different hardware configura-
tions. It is not a single machinery that becomes faster or 
more efficient while keeping its computational properties 
steady. Maturational deployment implies the qualitative acti-
vation of representational and processing capabilities that 
did not exist in former stages (Mareschal, 2011). On the oth-
er hand, the use of the already activated brain resources in 
order to support functional processes is not an immediate 
consequence of their activation. Many of these resources be-
come functional when combined with others, in order to re-
spond to arbitrary cultural demands. Thus, the gain in func-
tionality depends on some sort of learning too —basically of 
some sequences of inhibition and activation of brain states 
(Neubauer and Fink, 2009)— which is primed and fostered 
by contextual pressures (Heller and Perleth, 2008).  
Since brain’s maturation may show a variety of paces, or 
even sequences, and the use of active resources may depend 
on the demands posed by the environment, intellectual as-
sessment of children becomes a complex issue. Some ex-
pected scenarios would be, among many others: normal 
brain resources optimally articulated in functions that sup-
port a comparatively bright performance; or great brain re-
sources which have not yet been articulated, thus displaying 
mediocre performance. Fast paces of maturation would con-
figure advantageous brains, with a large amount of activated 
resources, in the first years of life. They could nevertheless 
turn into normal brains when maturation is mostly over, at 
the beginning of adolescence (Plomin and Spinath, 2004). 
In any event, a test score in infancy provides a mean to 
place the current state of someone’s cognitive or intellectual 
development compared with the average development of 
their peers. Given that the average is prone to fluctuation —
and does not necessarily yield an increase— a reasonable 
caution would be to avoid implications that go beyond what 
has, in fact, been measured: Age-relative performance. Sta-
ble diagnoses seem to be rather hazardous at the light of 
varying maturational processes, which take place alongside 
environmental unstable conditions, both in the broad cultur-
al context and in the specific family context of each person. 
The implications for high abilities diagnosed in child-
hood are important (Silverman, 2009). Firstly, some children 
that scored exceptionally high at a given age, may well score 
lower as they grow older. This can be expected from most 
cases of precocity (defined as a faster activation pace, but 
not a higher final amount of activated brain resources) as 
well as children that were exceptionally stimulated, or pres-
sured, to use the available brain resources —whether these 
resources were exceptional or not— to build functions that 
were not common at a given age. None of these cases imply 
a brain with exceptional capabilities once maturation is 
completed; a factor that should be the hard-core of any kind 
of high ability. Indeed, they cannot be considered as cases of 
high ability that has been ―lost‖. They never were a case of 
high ability, yet one of high performance in a test, compared 
to the average performance in that test, some years ago. 
Secondly, the opposite situation should also be expected. 
Children with slower maturation paces or with not so in-
tense stimulation should display discrete scores —though 
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not low— throughout their childhood. These cases would 
however reach maturation with more brain resources than 
average. They should be expected, hence, to be discarded as 
cases of high ability if evaluated in their childhood, although 
they could be ―recovered‖ as such cases from their adoles-
cence onwards. Rather than being ―hidden‖ cases, their abili-
ties were still being deployed, so they could not be consid-
ered as a true case of high ability until the maturational de-
ployment was completed. 
The expressions ―false-positives‖ and ―false-negatives‖ 
are commonly used in psychological and medical literature 
(Fiedler et al., 2012). These expressions encompass the two 
kinds of general situations described above, which represent 
a validity problem of the testing procedure, and other errors 
generated by the measurement process itself, which consti-
tute a reliability problem.  
Setting apart the instability of the object, that is the intel-
lectual functionality at a given age, the sampling of functions 
included in a test is a complementary validity issue that 
should not be overlooked. For instance, some ―Spatial Abil-
ity‖ tests simply contain a group of items that demand a sin-
gle operation (e.g. rotating shapes). Although there is no 
doubt that the rotation of shapes is an intellectual function 
that belongs to the broader class of spatial ability, it is also 
true that this class includes many more functions involved in 
operating with images and spatial properties of physical ob-
jects. With such a narrow sampling of spatial processes, it is 
risky to consider an individual to have spatial talent for hav-
ing scored, for example, at the 99 percentile in such a test. 
Even IQ tests have a limited sampling of intellectual and 
cognitive processes, which are very good predictors of 
school achievement, but show poor predictive value when 
tested against professional performance (Acar et al., 2016).  
Any of the above-mentioned situations considered 
would surely lead to a significant number of people poten-
tially being labelled as instances of high ability, according to 
the test scores, despite not actually being such cases. It 
would be important to appreciate that the meaning of high 
ability would be rather constricted by what is actually being 
measured by the test. The consequences involving expecta-
tions are: It is a reasonable prognosis anticipating good aca-
demic marks for those having high IQ scores, but there is 
no fundament to expect them to be awarded with a Nobel 
prize afterwards. It does not mean that their talent, or intel-
ligence, has been lost. Predicting a Nobel prize stands far 
beyond the scope of the processes sampled in any IQ test. 
The reliability issues of testing also have an important 
role in the provision of both false-positives and false-
negatives. Over-scoring, in the sense of getting a score that 
is higher than the actual trait that is supposed to be meas-
ured, is possible in different ways. One of them is related to 
speed in answering, something that is involved in many 
time-limited tests. Those that are faster either get a bonus or 
have the chance to respond more items, thus improving the 
probability of getting a higher score. Thus, the attitude of 
―be as fast as you can; whenever you don’t see a clear an-
swer to the item, just forget it and try the next one‖ is an 
advantageous strategy in many tests, yielding to higher out-
comes compared to those that devote more time to any of 
the items, in an attempt to thoroughly understand what the 
problem is. Similarly, remembering is normally faster than 
deducing, so reasoning may be factually penalised by time-
limited tests. Furthermore, personality traits like being more 
competitive or, with the opposite effects, perfectionism, may 
play a considerable role in obtaining a higher/lower test 
score. They are not, however, regarded as intelligence. 
A second source of over-scoring depends on the experi-
ence in tasks similar to those involved in a test. Many con-
siderations regarding the testing situation, the procedures for 
answering, the existence of one or more correct answers, 
among others, set up the conditions where behaviour takes 
place. Being familiar with the procedure and the kind of 
problems that will be faced, as well as having the appropriate 
behavioural skills for producing the answers (whether ver-
bally expressed or by means of filling some form) are central 
topics in test performance. High scores cannot be achieved 
without optimal competences in these fields which, as well 
as being fast, have a greater weight in this range of scores 
than in intermediate or low scores. The relative load of non-
intellectual components, hence, is larger in the upmost out-
comes than in medium or lower performances. Consequent-
ly, reliability indexes computed for any test describe how the 
tests performs in a wide sample, normally distributed, rather 
than a structural property that holds at any point of the 
scale. The highest scores will probably be more unstable that 
average or low scores, since the requirements for performing 
at that level are tougher. 
The statistical notion that embraces such irregular situa-
tions is normally called Type II errors, referring to the ab-
stract cases where the null hypothesis is rejected, although it 
should have been accepted (e.g. someone is diagnosed as an 
exceptional case, though he/she is a normal one). It can be 
quantified and becomes a particular dimension of the in-
strument’s reliability (Akobeng, 2016). There is an interest-
ing interaction between this kind of reliability and low preva-
lence phenomena, like high abilities. Even when the proba-
bility of a type II error is very small, say p = .05, which 
would indicate that the test is .95 reliable against this type of 
error, low prevalence cases are quite well identified but at 
the cost of many false-positives. Table 1 displays an example 
of the incidence of these computations. 
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Table 1. Effects of type II errors in the existence of false-positives. A prevalence of 0.02 and a probability of type II errors of 0.05 have been used to com-
pute the example data. 
Random sample 
(N = 1000) 
Expected cases according prevalence 
Diagnosed cases 
Correct Incorrect 
Have the trait 20 (2%) 19 (95% of 20) 1 (5% of 10) 
Don’t have the trait 980 (98%) 931 (95% of 980) 49 (5% of 980) 
 
Positive diagnoses 19 + 49 = 68 False-positives 49 (72.1%) 
Negative diagnoses 931 + 1 = 932 False-negatives 1 (0.11%) 
 
Even extremely low values of type II error (e.g. p = .01) 
would lead to a set of identified cases where false-positives 
were roughly half. The probability of a type II error is not 
normally provided in tests manuals however, because it 
should be computed for many specific criteria and its 
amount may vary depending on which criteria is considered. 
It cannot thus be assumed to be null. In most cases in fact, 
an estimation of p = .01 is more than optimistic.  
The computations displayed in Table 1 are the general 
case, whereby all the cases not having the trait have the same 
probability of scoring as a false-positive. A candidate may be 
plausibly considered as a false-positive, for instance, when a 
criterion of obtaining an IQ score greater than 130 (that is Z 
> 2) is used. A conservative approach would be to have 
those whose true scores ranged between 120 and 130. As-
suming a perfect normal distribution this would represent 
approximately 7% of the population. Table 2 shows the fig-
ures obtained with this correction. As can be observed, the 
proportion is less striking, though it is still considerable: 
around 15% of the diagnoses would be false-positives. 
 
Table 2. Effects of type II errors in the existence of false-positives. A prevalence of 0.02 and a probability of type II errors of 0.05 have been used to com-
pute the example data. The population of plausible candidates has been reduced to a 7%. 
Random sample 
(N = 1000) 
Expected cases according prevalence 
Diagnosed cases 
Correct Incorrect 
Have the trait 20 (2%) 19 (95% of 20) 1 (5% of 10) 
Don’t have the trait 70 (7%) 66 | 67 (95% of 70) 4 | 3 (5% of 70) 
 
Positive diagnoses 19 + 3 | 4 = 22 | 23 False-positives 3 | 4 (13.6% | 17.4%) 
Negative diagnoses 66 | 67 + 1 = 67 | 68 False-negatives 1 (1.5%) 
 
The combined effects of validity issues that depend on 
the variable nature of brain’s maturation and function con-
struction, combined with a limited sampling of such func-
tions, added to the reliability problems associated with type 
II errors in low prevalence populations, configure a scenario 
of deep uncertainty for diagnosis. Mistakes that take place in 
the identification stage will be carried on into later steps, 
such as educational actions. These problems are impossible 
to avoid on the basis of a testing procedure, particularly 
when someone is tested at a single time and at any point in 
their childhood. 
The main objective of our research is a preliminary de-
tection of variations in test scores from a group of children 
that were identified as having HIA, by means of a single-
time assessment, and are currently following an enrichment 
program. Since it is not possible to make a reasonable expec-
tation of the extent of such variations explicit from the theo-
retical background, our goal consisted of verifying whether 
significantly different scores in standardised tests do actually 
exist within a year’s gap. As a complementary objective, we 
have made a description of their intensity and distribution.  
These goals represent seminal research and are mainly 
oriented in order to gather cues of whether high tests scores 
are a stable way to assess high intellectual abilities. Further 
and deeper approaches, based on larger numbers of partici-
pants and control groups, would be required in order to de-
termine the precise extent of the eventual errors, their asso-
ciation with age, or their connection with different kinds of 
test. However, the detection of instability indicators in a re-
duced sample is a sound starting point and a solid indicator 
of worthy outcomes from these future, thorough research 
lines. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were selected incidentally. They all attended 
the enrichment program at the University of La Rioja, Spain, 
and have been previously diagnosed as having HIA in any of 
the profiles that it includes (giftedness or talent). All the par-
ticipants had a HIA diagnosed by the educational psycholo-
gist of their school. This diagnose was confirmed by our re-
search team. The criteria for inclusion are showed in the 
procedure. A total of n = 26 students participated (19 male 
and 7 female) in the study. The age range was between 12 
and 17 years, being the average age 13.89 years (SD = 1.09 
years). They were assessed at the end of the academic year 
of the extracurricular enrichment program. 
 
Instruments 
 
Differential Aptitude Test (DAT-5) (Bennett et al., 
2000). DAT-5 was used to assess the logical-deductive intel-
514                                                                Sylvia Sastre-Riba et al. 
anales de psicología / annals of psychology, 2018, vol. 34, nº 3 (october) 
lectual skills. The following sub-scales were used: Verbal 
Reasoning (VR), Numerical Reasoning (NR), Abstract Rea-
soning (AR), Mechanical Reasoning (MR), and Space Rela-
tions (SR). The Spanish version of the DAT was used in the 
present study. Previous studies have found adequate psy-
chometric properties for the DAT-5 scores (Bennett et al., 
2000). 
Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT) (Torrance, 
1974). We used only the figural section of the TTCT, in or-
der to evaluate different aspects of creative thinking: fluency 
(number of valid responses), flexibility (number of different 
categories of responses), and originality (statistical rarity of 
the responses). Elaboration scores (details in the composi-
tion of the response) were no computed. Previous studies 
have found adequate psychometric properties for the TCTT 
scores (Ferrando et al., 2007). 
 
Procedure 
 
The steps followed were: 1) Multidimensional intellectual 
measurement through: (a) DAT-5 and (b) TCTT. 2) Admin-
istration of the DAT-5 and TCTT at two time points, corre-
sponding to the end of the academic year on the extracur-
ricular enrichment program in two consecutive years.   
The administration was carried out in groups of up to 10 
participants, within the regular activities of the enrichment 
program, in a classroom equipped for this purpose and un-
der the supervision of a researcher who was known by the 
participants. The confidentiality of the responses was as-
sured at all times, as it was the voluntary nature of participa-
tion after their families were informed of the assessment 
procedure. The participants received no incentive for their 
participation.  
This study was carried out in accordance with the rec-
ommendations of the Research and Ethic Committee at 
University of La Rioja with written informed consent from 
all participants. All subjects gave written informed consent 
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The proto-
col was approved by the Research and Ethic Committee at 
University of La Rioja. 
 
Data Analysis  
 
Different data analyses were performed: a) descriptive 
statistics were calculated for the DAT-5 and TTCT scores 
for each time point; b) direct scores were transformed into Z 
scores in order to estimate the variation within age average; 
c) mean comparisons for the DAT-5 and TTCT scores be-
tween the two time points; and d) Pearson’s correlation co-
efficients were estimated to test the stability of scores be-
tween the two time points for the overall group. 
Since variation in individual scores might be cancelled 
when using group statistics, individual Z scores from the two 
measurement points were subtracted for testing whether rel-
evant variations existed. Since they are individual scores, 
usual statistical intervals, which are devised for samples and 
populations, cannot be used. The criterion must necessarily 
be somewhat arbitrary though reasonable. A difference of | 
Z1 - Z2 | equal or greater than one was established as the 
way to determine whether the observed change was relevant 
or not. It should be noted that, for most cases, a full stand-
ard deviation change would imply a shift in the diagnosis: 
cases of high ability that are no longer exceptional or cases 
of mid-high scores that fall within the high ability bounda-
ries.  
Considering the most traditional approaches based on 
IQ scores, where giftedness is normally defined as an IQ > 
130, one standard deviation decrease would make those that 
formerly scored between 131 and 145 non-gifted; and an in-
crease of one standard deviation would make those who 
scored from 116 to 130 gifted. Taking these kinds of shifts 
into consideration in the diagnosis is a central goal of this 
work. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Participants’ raw DAT-5 and TTCT scores are summa-
rized in Table 3, where descriptive statistics are presented. It 
should be noted that, for some cases, the one-year differ-
ence involved using a different version of the subscale, as 
the DAT-5 items differ to encompass different age-groups. 
The average raw scores of the second time point were, thus, 
lower than those of the first time point, since they belonged 
to the youngest of the new age-interval, while the former av-
erage belonged to the eldest of the previous age-interval. In 
any case, for further computations raw scores where con-
verted to Z scores using the tables mean and standard devia-
tion, therefore being normalised. 
 
Correlations and mean differences across time 
 
Correlations between the two measurements points are 
presented in table 4. These coefficients were computed still 
using the raw scores of the DAT-5 and TTCT subscales. It 
can be observed that, despite most of the indexes being sta-
tistically significant (p < .05), the determination index (ob-
tained by R2) is rather poor in many subscales, particularly in 
those involved in creativity. Even the best of these indexes 
explains only 69.22% of the variance, a factor that implies 
that more than 30% of the variance cannot be attributed to 
common components in the two measurements points. Five 
out of eight subscales share less than the fifty percent of 
their variance and, setting apart the creativity indexes which 
are known to be weakly correlated, the shared variance for 
abstract reasoning is strikingly poor —less than 25%. 
When contrasting the Z scores of the two measurements 
points (displayed in table 5) it can be observed that for the 
overall sample of participants no statistically significant dif-
ferences exist except for Numerical reasoning (p = .042). 
Correlations obtained were smaller, except for numerical 
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reasoning again, that obtains the highest r, both for raw- and 
Z-scores. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the DAT and TTCT scores in the overall 
sample. 
  Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Range 
Time 1 
DAT VR 28.75 5.69 -0.32 -0.44 17-38 
DAT NR 25.32 6.84 -0.00 -0.99 13-38 
DAT AR 30.07 6.97 -0.90 0.09 13-39 
DAT MR 44.39 7.48 -0.11 -0.90 31-57 
DAT SR 36.46 9.84 -0.39 -1.37 19-49 
TCTT Fl 14.07 5.11 0.30 -1.02 6-23 
TCTT Fx 10.79 3.77 0.79 0.29 6-20 
TCTT Or 22.79 8.24 -0.18 -0.57 6-38 
Time 2 
DAT VR 33.11 4.52 -1.23 2.17 19-39 
DAT NR 27.36 6.07 -0.21 -1.10 17-37 
DAT AR 34.57 4.91 -1.85 4.41 18-40 
DAT MR 47.63 6.55 -0.37 -0.46 33-58 
DAT SR 38.57 10.54 -0.61 -1.30 17-49 
TTCT Fl 15.46 6.96 0.29 -0.93 4-28 
TTCT Fx 11.64 4.86 0.25 -0.32 2-21 
TTCT Or 27.68 14.92 1.15 0.64 11-65 
Note. M= Mean; SD= Standard Deviation; DAT= Differential Aptitude 
Test; TTCT= Torrance Test of Creative Thinking; VR= Verbal Reasoning; 
NR= Numerical Reasoning; AR= Abstract Reasoning; MR= Mechanical 
Reasoning; SR= Space Relations; Fl= Fluency; Fx= Flexibility; 
Or=Originality. 
Table 4. Pearson correlation between DAT and TCTT scores in two tem-
poral points. 
 Pearson’s r Variance explained (%) 
DAT VR .593** 35.16 
DAT NR .789** 62.25 
DAT AR .491** 24.11 
DAT MR .832** 69.22 
DAT SR .785** 61.62 
TTCT Fl .337 11.36 
TTCT Fx .399* 15.92 
TTCT Or .297 8.82 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
Note. DAT= Differential Aptitude Test; TTCT= Torrance Test of Creative 
Thinking; VR= Verbal Reasoning; NR= Numerical Reasoning; AR= Ab-
stract Reasoning; MR= Mechanical Reasoning; SR= Space Relations; Fl= 
Fluency; Fx= Flexibility; Or=Originality  
 
Individual variation 
 
Individual differences in Z scores between the two 
measurements are displayed in Table 6. Since they are com-
puted by simply subtracting the Z score from time one to 
the Z score from time two, they are still in Z units. Cases 
and scales with an absolute variation greater that 1 (i.e. one 
standard deviation in the normalised scores) are displayed in 
bold. 
 
 
Table 5. Student’s t test for related samples in two temporal points. Z scores for DAT-5 scales and brute scores for Torrance. 
 
Differences 
t p Pearson’s r Variance explained (%) 
M SD 
DAT VR -0.106 0.992 -0.567 .575 .290 8.41 
DAT NR 0.342 0.848 2.136 .042 .834** 69.56 
DAT AR -0.243 0.787 -1.637 .113 .405* 16.40 
DAT MR 0.165 0.600 1.427 .166 .711** 50.55 
DAT SR 0.237 0.696 1.799 .083 .733** 53.72 
TTCT Fl -1.393 7.115 -1.036 .309 .337 11.36 
TTCT Fx -0.857 4.813 -0.942 .354 .399* 15.92 
TTCT Or -4.893 14.743 -1.756 .090 .297 8.82 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
Note. DAT= Differential Aptitude Test; TTCT= Torrance Test of Creative Thinking; VR= Verbal Reasoning; NR= Numerical Reasoning; AR= Abstract 
Reasoning; MR= Mechanical Reasoning; SR= Space Relations; Fl= Fluency; Fx= Flexibility; Or=Originality. 
 
By visual inspection, it can be observed that only eight 
participants have variations lower than one standard devia-
tion in all five subscales. The reaming twenty participants 
(that is, almost three quarters of the sample) varied at least 
more than one standard deviation in one subscale, and six of 
them have done so in two or three subscales. Also as an 
overview, the decreases double the increases. This observa-
tion is made systematic in table 7, where a summary of the 
number of participants and their changes above one stand-
ard deviation is displayed. Only eight participants remain 
steady, according to the one standard deviation criterion, 
and it is quite notorious that two participants show a de-
crease in three subscales out of five. On the other hand, two 
other participants have shown an increase in one subscale as 
well as a decrease in another. 
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Table 6. Variations in the Z individual scores for each participant. 
Participant 
 
DAT VR DAT NR DAT AR DAT MR DAT SR 
1 2.07 -0.12 0.28 --- -0.72 
2 0.23 0.76 0.44 -1.09 -0.79 
3 0.85 -1.05 1.39 -0.29 -0.47 
4 -1.17 -0.47 -0.40 -0.12 -2.77 
5 -0.18 -1.21 -0.28 0.50 0.80 
6 0.65 -0.48 0.32 -0.48 0.52 
7 0.57 0.37 0.54 -0.28 0.30 
8 -0.20 0.53 1.03 0.64 -0.84 
9 1.62 0.49 2.14 -0.26 -0.07 
10 -0.68 -0.81 0.46 0.16 0.03 
11 0.41 0.53 -0.29 0.21 -0.12 
12 1.40 -0.81 0.11 -0.29 -0.60 
13 -1.60 -1.07 -0.63 -1.58 -0.93 
14 -0.12 0.68 1.53 -0.10 -0.03 
15 0.64 -1.50 -0.07 -0.35 -0.56 
16 -0.26 1.35 -0.28 -0.05 0.10 
17 0.31 -0.08 0.55 -0.12 0.33 
18 0.04 -1.41 0.80 -0.46 0.72 
19 -0.10 0.72 0.52 0.47 0.59 
20 1.01 -0.98 -0.73 -1.01 -0.20 
21 -0.78 -1.15 -0.61 0.10 -0.13 
22 0.32 -0.57 0.70 -0.45 -0.07 
23 0.41 -1.05 0.42 0.44 -0.20 
24 0.57 -1.47 0.34 0.78 0.18 
25 0.00 -0.08 -1.30 -0.64 -0.76 
26 0.75 -0.42 0.92 0.29 0.17 
27 -1.06 -1.28 -1.15 -1.20 -0.65 
28 -2.71 0.98 0.06 0.76 -0.43 
Note. DAT= Differential Aptitude Test; TTCT= Torrance Test of Creative Thinking; VR= Verbal Reasoning; NR= Numerical Reasoning; AR= Abstract 
Reasoning; MR= Mechanical Reasoning; SR= Space Relations
 
Table 7. Number of cases and scales with a variation of more than one standard deviation. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5  
 
 
 
Total 
Increase 
 
8 
7 (*) 1 0 0 0 8 (*) 
Decrease 11 (*) 1 2 0 0 14 (*) 
Total 8 18 (*) 2 2 0 0 30 (*) 
(*) Two of the participants increased in one scale and decreased in another scale more than one standard deviation. Hence they are counted twice. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
According to Silverman (2009), it is essential to select people 
with HIA in order to provide the correct tools to favour 
their optimal development and their potential manifestation. 
Nevertheless, despite there have been improvements in effi-
ciency and ease on test scoring, the stability of the scores is 
not assured. The emerging perspectives of HIA assessment 
should be more attentive to neurosciences results and the 
developmental paradigm  (Dai and Chen, 2014; Subotnik et 
al., 2011) in order to found HIA identification in its actual 
ground —exceptional brain resources and a proper exploita-
tion of such resources in outstanding cognitive functions— 
instead of identifying HIA with a test score. Cross-
measurements, as well as repeated testing, will surely provide 
an assessment context far better than that resulting from a 
single extreme score. These approaches will also help in 
dealing with Type I and Type II errors, since the multiplicity 
of cues should converge in true cases of HIA.  
In the present study, the fact that the sample was rather 
reduced is a factor that must be taken into account as being 
a limitation on the extent of the conclusions. In addition, the 
lack of control group is a limitation of the research design 
and precludes the generalization of the results found. The 
limited size notwithstanding, some interesting properties 
were present: firstly, all cases had been previously diagnosed 
as high abilities by independent professionals; the assess-
ments employed in this research was a part of the routine 
cognitive and intellectual evaluation that takes place within 
the enrichment program that the participants were taking. 
Secondly, the instrument employed was exactly the same in 
both measurements, with the second measure obtained 12 to 
13 months after the first one. Thirdly, that amount of time 
between measures should be considered short to moderate 
for observing important changes due to maturation, particu-
larly in those participants whose ages were close to the end 
of maturational deployment. 
These conditions, on the one hand, do limit the generali-
sation of the proportions of change in the scores that were 
observed, but, on the other hand, since they are far from the 
Stability of Measure In High Intellectual Ability: Preliminary results                                                                                        517 
 
anales de psicología / annals of psychology, 2018, vol. 34, nº 3 (october) 
most favourable setting for detecting changes in the scores, 
provide a solid grounding for the evidences found and rele-
vant differences have actually been observed. Among them, 
the most notorious are those where the scores decreased 
significantly. On the contrary, increases in the score may be 
explained, at least in part, by the training effect of repeating 
the same task one year after, something that happened to all 
the participants. Nevertheless, there were some exceptions 
where the increase was clearly beyond training. Overall, re-
sults show that test scores may change in a considerable 
amount in many supposedly HIA individuals. 
It is worth remarking that part of the variation can be at-
tributed to changes in the tables or even in the scale that is 
used for intellectual assessment. In this study, the scale (i.e. 
the list of items) was exactly the same in the two measure-
ments, but changes in the tables are impossible to avoid. 
Hence, a difficult item may generate sudden jumps in the 
top percentiles at a given age, where such item is seldom 
correctly responded, and the same item may become moder-
ately difficult after one year. Since the threshold that deter-
mines an exceptionality diagnose is very narrow, these kind 
of jumps in the top percentiles constitute a source of insta-
bility which is not attributable to the respondents. 
The scores in creativity were the most fluctuating, some-
thing that could be expected of these scales having the low-
est reliability indexes. Variation however, was also detected 
in scales having sound reliability indexes, such as the abstract 
reasoning scale of the DAT-5. In any event, it is not possible 
to distinguish, with such a short time distance, which was 
the cause of the variation. In a general approach, however, 
some developmental patterns could be expected if repeated 
measures were taken within a wider time span. For instance, 
cases of precocity should display a descending trend as they 
get closer to adolescence. On the contrary, ascending trends 
would indicate that solid brain resources are being activated 
and articulated. And limiting cases, probably false-positives, 
should oscillate around the criterion boundary in different 
assessments, not displaying a clear trend. Whatever the case, 
it seems clear that single-moment measurements are not re-
liable, at least before adolescence. Both the ordinary though 
sensitive changes in the underlying neurological and cogni-
tive processes and the limitations attributable to the tests, 
which scores cannot be considered error-free, reduce dra-
matically the probability of point-diagnoses of high ability 
being completely sure. 
The incidence of measurement errors in the highest 
scores should be considered as predictably higher than the 
estimations made for all range of scores. In general, high 
scores demand that all the conditions in the response are 
perfectly met. A slight loss in concentration, for instance, 
may consume enough time to prevent completing the scale. 
Similarly, fatigue may be a major handicap when dealing 
with the most complicated items, that are usually the last 
presented. On the contrary, intermediate scores are not so 
sensitive to these hard demanding conditions because items’ 
difficulty is lesser. A moderate number of correct responses, 
where it does not matter which items were wrong, provided 
that they were not much, will lead to a similar intermediate 
result. But, for the highest results, almost all responses must 
be correct and fast. On the other hand, the effects of the 
lack of stability that may be observed in the high range of 
scores have small consequences in the overall reliability of 
the scale, because high scorers are a tiny proportion of the 
population. It is however a serious issue when focussing in 
this group, something that happens when assessing high 
abilities. 
For the false-positive cases, the mistaken diagnose may 
have important and undesirable effects. Some of the most 
relevant would be: the generation of performance expecta-
tions that cannot be attained; the wrong attribution of the 
descent in performance to lack of commitment or, in other 
common explanations, to inappropriate intervention; or an 
overload of learning tasks that gradually demand more and 
more time or even exceed the available resources of the 
learner. Their parents will have to cope with a performance 
situation that contradicts their expectations, as well as many 
questions about what is going wrong. And educators will ob-
serve that children diagnosed as high ability do not perform 
much differently from their average class-mates. Overall, 
this situation has no positive outcomes for anyone, nor for 
the sake of science, and simply weakens the confidence peo-
ple may have on high intellectual ability diagnoses.  
In order to foster HIA individuals and their wellness, it 
is essential to be careful with mistaken diagnoses (false-
negatives and false-positives), since they are going to pro-
duce developmental consequences. Tests can no doubt be 
used, alongside with other behavioural products, but single-
point measurements should be replaced by multiple-points 
assessment and a thorough analysis of the trend. In any case, 
being a case of high intellectual ability should not be the 
consequence of achieving a given test score, but that of an 
exceptional brain configuration and exploitation of such 
brain resources. Whenever these resources only become evi-
dent in a test score, in a single moment, they probably have 
no much to do with HIA. 
The core point is that HIA are not the consequence of 
having a high score in a test. That is rather an indicator, an 
evaluation procedure, which is not more valid than the phe-
nomenon itself. The adequate reasoning should be that HIA 
individuals are expected to get high scores in intellectu-
al/ability tests, as well as in many other behavioural prod-
ucts. Taking all of these indicators into account for support-
ing a diagnose is a far more solid approach than just trusting 
test scores. Test scores can provide a fast, easy way of detec-
tion, but are neither the cause nor the main proof of being a 
HIA case. Were Marie Curie, Pablo Picasso or Albert Ein-
stein cases of HIA because they scored beyond a given point 
in some test? Well, if they were tested, it really does not 
mind their result. All of them demonstrated outstanding 
abilities by means of their products. Conversely, assuming 
that those high-scorers in tests that do not demonstrate any-
thing else with situated products are HIA cases may look 
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like a measurement artifact. 
In general, it would be a wise approach to HIA to post-
pone the diagnosis and to respond to educational needs that 
are objectively expressed meanwhile. For instance, when a 
student has achieved most of the educational goals of a giv-
en course, some sort of adjustment of the educational re-
sponse is needed. The reason may be – or not – that this 
student is a case of HIA. However it does not provide rele-
vant information to the educational reasoning: what makes 
no sense is teaching contents that are perfectly mastered by 
a student. The educational response, thus, should focus on 
different, not yet mastered, contents; or in a deeper ap-
proach to the already mastered contents; or in connecting 
these contents with other materials. Many of these actions 
are positive both for many HIA students and for not HIA 
students as well. But no diagnose is essential for providing 
such an educational response. 
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